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1. Introduction
The flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) have increased markedly since the end of the 1980s, after the collapse of the centrally
planned regimes and the beginning of the process of transition to the market economy. This has
provided grounds for many analyses of FDI flows in the countries concerned, particularly from
the European Union, in view of a possible integration between the two neighbouring areas.
However, scant attention has been paid to the analysis of FDI from and towards Less Favoured
Regions (LFRs) of both sides, despite its significance in terms of growth patterns and rates.
While during the process of industrialisation and afterwards (1960-80) Greek outward investment
to Western and developing countries had been marginal, and government policy had only emphasised
inward investment, the potential opportunities arising from investment in CEECs have recently
changed the scene. This is arguably in accordance with the concept of the investment development
cycle, suggesting that, as a country develops, its propensity to engage in outward investment (as well
as to be invested in) proceeds through various phases, with outward FDI becoming a means of
industrial restructuring only in the final stages of development (Ozawa 1991; Dunning 1991).
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the FDI flows from a peripheral EU economy,
Greece, to two LFRs of Central Europe, Bulgaria and Romania. In particular, the objective is to
analyse key criteria underlying investment choices by Greek firms, in order to help identify their
role in the restructuring process and the impact that outward flows may have on the Greek
economy.
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The empirical analysis is based on the results of a survey carried out in 1995-96 as part of
an ACE Project supported by the European Commission on the economic integration through
FDI in the less favoured CEECs and the impact on the LFRs of the European Union.
1 A
questionnaire was sent to Greek companies that had undertaken foreign direct investment
projects in Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic
2: the responding firms were 96 and the
total number of investments in the three countries was 104.
3 In this paper we focus on Greek
outward FDI in Bulgaria and Romania, using part of the database in trying to draw some
implications for the home country, with a sample of 76 Greek parents and 85 direct investments
in the two CEECs.
4
The paper is divided into six sections. Section II introduces the general hypotheses and the
interpretation proposed on the basis of the literature. The third section describes the suggested
methodology and the selected variables. Section four illustrates the relevant features of Greek
outward FDI in the two CEECs as they emerge from the survey. Section five comments on the
empirical findings of the econometric analysis. Section VI provides some concluding remarks and
highlights further questions for future research.
2. Greek FDI in Bulgaria and Romania: the hypotheses
The impact of FDI on the home and the host country depends crucially upon the
characteristics of the economies involved and upon the strategies followed by multinational
enterprises (MNEs). From the viewpoint of the MNE, the delocalisation of production operations
offers, among others, opportunities to exploit the firm’s competitive capacity into new high
                                                       
1 The EU investing countries considered in the ACE Project (No 94-0719-R) were Greece and Portugal and the
survey addressed also their subsidiaries in CEECs, allowing a database of 220 firms in total. In this paper we
consider only the results for Greek parents which invested in Bulgaria and Romania.
2 There were very few responses (and investments) at the last mentioned, and none of any major economic
significance. Whilst this has interesting economic implications (as it underlies the potential role of geography and
culture), it allows us to exclude the Slovac Republic for the purposes of this particular study.
3 The questionnaire was elaborate and arguably a strength to the study and our results. It was the joint effort of the
authors and all the partners to the ACE project for which the questionnaire was devised and data collected, as well
as a number of research associates. It was based on existing questionnaires by the UN, the OECD and other
studies, and increasingly improved over a six month period by, in particular, the co-ordinator of the project C.
Pitelis, partners R. Sugden, I. Anton and T. Houbenova and research associates Lisa de Propis and Anastasia
Pseiridis. The questionnaire (which is available by the authors on request) was sent to the top 120 Greek investors,
known to be genuine (it is known that various alleged investments represent little more that nameplates on a door,
if that) and of some significance. The response rate was extremely high because of the use of an army of research
assistants (around 80) and because the coordinator was at the time also working on a related project at the Greek
Ministry of Development, which facilitated access considerably. For these reasons this is a unique and arguably
hard to replicate database, on an under-researched topic.3
potential markets. Empirical analyses have shown that MNE activity may have a positive effect
on trade, productivity and economic restructuring of home countries (see, among others,
Dunning 1985). The overall direct and indirect effects, however, can be either “driving” or
“enfeebling” with respect to the home industrial base, depending upon the type and pattern of
FDI and upon the comparative points of strength and weakness of the national economy.
Moreover, the relationship between FDI and trade tends to intensify their impact, enhancing the
national competitiveness as much as, in the wrong circumstances, weakening it, thus reinforcing
virtuous and vicious cycles both in the investor’s home country and in the host location (Cantwell
1987; Cantwell and Dunning 1991; Howells and Michie 1997).
The improvement of MNE competitiveness need not necessarily imply that of its home
country. Although up to a point outward investment may arguably be seen as a sign of the
achievement of advanced stages of development (Ozawa 1991), competitiveness of Greek firms needs
not imply competitiveness of Greece as a nation (Pitelis 1993, 1994; Cowling and Sugden 1994).
5
The relationships between the nation state and the investor have been defined as power
relationships (Dicken 1994, 122), in which a bargaining process is involved (Pitelis 1990). The
conditions for competitiveness, in the current era of globalisation, need careful evaluation and
monitoring of FDI flows (both outward and inward) and of their role in sustaining the
competitive advantage of the country as a whole. In other words, account needs to be taken of
the factors responsible for the characteristics of outward flows. If they arise as a result of the
creation of a higher level of firm-specific assets, and hence faster rates of domestic innovation,
then economic growth and competitiveness are likely to be enhanced. Alternatively, if outward
FDI occurs on the basis of cost differentials alone, then the domestic production base may turn
out to be reduced (Barrel and Pain 1997). Policy making of the home country of the MNE has
suffered from uncertainty about the effects of FDI (Blomström, Fors and Lipsey 1997).
These issues are particularly relevant in the case of a EU LFR, such as Greece, insofar as the
decision to undertake investments in Central and Eastern European LFRs, such as Bulgaria and
Romania, entails high uncertainty and risks. In this case, therefore, investors are obliged to
engage themselves in the costly exercise of collecting information and taking up the risks
associated to the relatively unknown and unpredictable economic and political environment.
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One of the most debated issues in the literature has traditionally been the relationship between
FDI and exports, which may be substitutes or complements depending upon the type of FDI
undertaken. On the other hand, the form of the MNE participation in the investment, which is
becoming increasingly “pluralistic” (Dunning 1991), is likely to reflect the global marketing and
production strategies followed by MNEs, enabling them to increase their competitive advantage
vis á vis other MNEs, by sourcing local strengths, resources and capabilities. Thus, the
distinction of FDI by type and control mode proved to be of utmost importance in assessing the
impact of direct investments (Dunning 1991; Lankes and Venables, 1996, 1997).
FDI has been classified in the literature in different ways, according to the main objective of
the investment itself (type of FDI). Drawing from different classifications proposed by Cantwell
and Sanna-Randaccio (1992), Dunning (1993), Acocella (1995), Lankes and Venables (1997)
and Mutinelli and Piscitello (1996), we may divide FDI by type in three categories.
Firstly, between export-platform and rationalised investments (Exporters), primarily designed
to supply exports outside the host region, and market-orientated investments (Local suppliers),
aimed at serving the local host market. While the first category of FDI type (Exporters) relies
essentially on attractions provided by local production conditions and resources, and play little or
no role in supplying the host market, FDI in the second category (Local suppliers) is customarily
indicated as import-substituting investment (Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio 1992).
In the case of Exporters factor cost advantage plays a rather bigger role than in the case of
market-orientated investment, fostering decentralisation of stages of production (vertical
investment) and possibly generating structural effects, i.e. altering the home production base. As
shown by Pfaffermayr (1996) and Blomström and Kokko (1994), FDI and trade appear to be
complementary partly as a result of these structural effects, insofar as rationalised FDI tends to
crowd out similar exports from the home country, but also to create new intermediate flows.
Therefore, if production is moved to a foreign location and the home country shifts its
specialization in the production of intermediates, requiring more skilled labour and technology,
the competitive position of the country as a whole may be substantially improved.
On the contrary, market-orientated FDI - Local suppliers type - aiming at producing close to
the market the same good produced at home (horizontal investment), in order to adapt it to local
demand conditions, is more likely to negatively affect imports from home.5
The third category involves what we have called market-exploring FDI (Distributors), in
which the objective of the investment is essentially to satisfy local demand by importing
investor’s products/services through local distribution networks. Its effects are generally
considered to be positive, as it acts as sales and marketing base to promote exports from the
home country into the host economy (export-promoting) (Lankes and Venables 1996,1997).
The three categories clearly simplify the strategies pursued by the investors, which usually
undertake the FDI projects to achieve more than one objective at the same time. Therefore, from
a conceptual viewpoint, they would not be mutually exclusive and have to be viewed as an
interpretative scheme, helping us to analyse FDI carried out by Greek MNEs in the two CEECs.
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The second attempt to classify FDI has been made on the control mode chosen by the parent
company to establish an affiliate abroad (control mode of FDI)). The three categories in this case
are easily identifiable from the indication given by Greek respondents: - Wholly owned; - Joint
venture; - Licensing-franchising. As stated in the conventional literature on MNEs, FDI arises
from a combination of industrial organization and firm specific reasons, the result being a number
of activities placed under different forms of ownership and control (Holland and Pain 1998;
Pitelis and Sugden 1999). The latter depend upon several factors which are behind the general
strategy underlying the FDI, and their investigation may provide essential information on the
impact on the country of origin. A clear illustration of the implications of the control mode is
provided by Lankes and Venables (1997), showing that wholly owned foreign production
appears to be more integrated within the MNE, generating substantial intra-firm trade flows,
whilst joint ventures FDI has less linkages with the home parent, being more likely to be chosen
as a control mode by firms which value access to local tangible and intangible assets.
In the next sections we analyse the determinants of the two types of classification that have
been widely recognised as crucial to achieve a better understanding of MNEs strategies.
3. The methodology
3.1  The model
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The aim of the empirical analysis is to explore some of the factors which may affect the
type and the control mode of FDI. Indeed, the investigation of the strategies which have guided
Greek MNEs in the two CEECs might help to shed some light on the implications that outward
flows have for a peripheral EU economy such as Greece.
The econometric analysis adopted is probabilistic. The model used is a multinomial logit
model, since the dependent variable has more than two categories, i.e. in our database both the
type and the control mode have three possible outcomes. In other cases, in which only two of the
three categories of the dependent variable are considered, we use a binomial logit model, from
now on logit model.
Consider firstly the logit model. In this case the dependent variable, as already stated, is a
dummy variable. The probability of the event occurring is determined by:
Prob (Yi = 1) = F (a +bXi) =  exp (a + bXi)
                                             1 + exp (a + bXi)
For both the logit model and the multinomial logit, the interpretation of the coefficients is
transparent, considering the log odds ratio. After some manipulation, using the logit model we
can write:
loge [Prob (Yi = 1)/1 - Prob (Yi = 1)] = a + bXi
The effect of a unit change in X on the log odds ratio of the event occurring is given by
the beta coefficient. Taking into consideration the log odds ratio is very useful since the
interpretation of the coefficient is immediate.
The multinomial logit is somewhat different from the simple binomial model. In fact, it
allows for more than two possible outcomes, three in our case. Since there is the possibility that
different parametrisations could generate identical probabilities leading to an issue of
indeterminacy, a normalisation is required (Theil Normalisation). Hence, we will consider (for
each of the two classifications here adopted) the coefficient of the first category as the base
category with the parameters set equal to zero. Therefore, since there are three possible
outcomes, we have two log odds ratios. For the multinomial model the log odds ratios are
defined as follows:7
loge (p1/p0) = a1 + b1X
loge (p2/p0) = a2 + b2X
loge (p2/p1) = (a2 + b2X) - (a1 + b1X) = (a2 - a1) + (b2 - b1)X
where
pi =  exp (a + bXi)                                              i = 0, 1, 2
      1 + exp (a + bXi)
As logit models are not linear in the parameters, they were estimated by using maximum
likelihood techniques.
3.2 The variables used
The model estimates the impact of some of the investor’s features on the probability of
the FDI to fall into a particular type or control mode category. As already stated, the first
dependent variable (TYPE) in the model has three different categories: Exporters, Local
suppliers and Distributors.
As for other variables here considered, the construction of TYPE was made by crossing
the information given by several variables included in the questionnaire. The unit of analysis is the
investment, since some of the surveyed parent companies invested in both countries under
investigation. In order to assign each FDI to one and only one category, we checked the data for
variables such as the main area of activity of the parent firm, purchase of output and supply of
inputs from and to affiliates, possible inclusion in privatisation programmes, motivations of the
FDI. This procedure allowed us to identify the prevalent objective of the investment and
therefore the type category.
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The other dependent variable considered is the control mode on the affiliate chosen by the
Greek parent (CONTROL). As for TYPE, the CONTROL variable has three different categories:
Wholly owned, Joint venture and Licensing-franchising. In this case, the association of each FDI
with the relevant category was straightforward, since the questionnaire had a rather detailed
section on ownership and control from Greek parent companies.8
The independent variables which may affect the probability that the FDI falls into one of
the strategies considered are all dummies.
The country variable (BULGARIA) was introduced so as to check whether the country
characteristics have a bearing on private investment decisions. Although both CEECs considered
were ranked more or less equal on the basis of the EBRD transition index (EBRD 1995)
8, their
rather different economic, political and social contexts suggest a relation with the kind of foreign
investment choice.
9
Four industry variables (IND0, IND1, IND2, IND3) were created according to the main
product/service produced by the parent firm. The classification used for the industry coding is the
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), Rev. 3. The main sector of activity of the
parent firm is expected to influence the strategy of the MNE, thus affecting the probability of FDI
belonging to a particular category of the two classifications. However, as stressed by many
authors (e.g., Holland and Pain 1998), it should be noted that, as both the theoretical and
empirical analysis of FDI has traditionally been constrained by the absence of the sectoral
dimension, it is difficult to appraise the expected impact of the industry variables on the basis of
established foundations.
The motivations underlying the decision to become an investor in the two CEECs
represent another group of dummies, which can be generally assembled as economic, social and
political variables.  Finally, the last group of independent variables refers to the risks and
constraints faced by the investor, and perceived as the most serious, in undertaking the
investment in Bulgaria and Romania. Also in this case, the variables can be grouped according to
the economic, social and political nature of the constraint. In general terms, it might be expected
that, whilst the combination of many different motivations, as well as risk perceptions, determines
the level of Greek outward investment in the area, and therefore the general decision to
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8 Such index was used to assess the progress of the transition of previously centrally-planned economies to market
liberalisation. The transition index, which was calculated as the average of nine indicators and varies between 1
(little progress) and 4 (advanced transition), ranked in 1995 Bulgaria slightly above Romania, with an index of
2.56 and 2.44 respectively.
9 Although the FDI cumulated inflows in the period 1989-96 were much greater in Romania (1,191 million US$)
than in Bulgaria (419 million US$), the same inflows as percent of GDP were much smaller in the first country
(3.4) - having a population twice as bigger than Bulgaria - than in the latter (4.8). Differences emerge in many
fields: for example, the EBRD classification of transitional economies by their methods of privatisation shows
that, while in Bulgaria privatisation has proceeded largely by means of sales to foreign owners, Romania has
adopted primarily privatisation schemes offering fewer opportunities to the involvement of foreign firms (see also
Holland and Pain 1998).9
undertake FDI, only a few are crucial in choosing the type and the control mode of the
investment. What we might intuitively expect on the basis of the literature is that relative costs
considerations, availability of resources and trade openness would be related to the probability of
having export-platform FDI versus local suppliers and distributors. Moreover, the control mode
is likely to be affected by the type of FDI, which in fact enters as an independent variable in the
determination of ownership modes.
Appendix 1 reports the description of the variables, both dependent and independent,
used in our analysis.
4.  Greek FDI in Bulgaria and Romania: some descriptive features
In this section, we present some characteristics of Greek investors that have established
affiliates in Bulgaria and Romania. The overall number of FDI is 85 and, as already explained, it
does not coincide with the number of investors, i.e. 76 parent companies, because some of them
have invested in both countries.
It is worth mentioning briefly some general features arising from our database. First of all,
the survey was mainly addressed to large firms, operating in both manufacturing and service
sectors. Thus, FDI considered here is mostly attributable to rather old and experienced firms,
exhibiting a relatively high propensity to invest abroad - the actual Greek multinational
corporations, such as, for example, Rolco-Vianil (detergents and soaps), Intracom
(telecommunication equipment, information systems and related services), Hellenic Bottling
Company (soft drinks), Delta (dairy products, frozen food). While many of them are long-term
operating firms, for which the internationalisation process had started much before the collapse
of the centrally planned economies (the European Union partners being their main locational
target), only a tiny proportion of parents declared to have been in operation in the CEECs for
more than one-two years (as stated the survey was carried out in 1995-96).
Table 1 reports Greek investments by type category and host country.10




Exporters 12 5 17
Local suppliers 29 30 59
Distributors 5 4 9
Total 46 39 85
It turns out that direct investments are not clearly orientated toward one rather than the
other CEEC and, for the categories of local suppliers and distributors, the geographical division
of investments between the two countries is approximately 50% each. Only in the case of
exporters a relative preference towards investing in Romania emerges. Nearly 70% of Greek
investments are attributed to the local suppliers category. This is in line with the majority of
evidence, typically suggesting that market-orientated FDI constitutes the bulk of foreign
investments in CEECs, with factor costs playing a relative small role.











Exporters - 5 4 3 5 17
Local suppliers 3 10 15 15 16 59
Distributors - - - - 9 9
Total 3 15 19 18 30 85
Table 2 shows that the relationship between FDI type and industry group is not clearly
defined, except for the category of distributors, which are completely concentrated in the service
sector. The latter sector represents the highest share (35.3%) of Greek FDI in the two CEECs
considered, regarding in particular wholesale and retail trade, transport, tourism, financial and
business services. The tiny number of FDI undertaken in the Primary and Mining sector
motivated our choice to merge this industry group with that of Heavy Manufacturing.
Considering manufacturing as a whole, FDI is primarily directed in food products and beverages,
chemical products, textiles, wearing and leather products and metal products. On the one hand,
this is in line with the Greek relative specialisation in traditional sectors; on the other hand,11
CEECs are expected to be interesting and growing markets especially for these categories of
products. High-tech manufacturing, which mainly includes chemicals and pharmaceutical and
telecommunication equipment and apparatus, shows that the technological factor is indeed
particularly significant in market-orientated FDI, allowing firms to exploit their ownership
advantages due to technological competence and know-how (Mutinelli and Piscitello 1996).
10
This provides some prima facie evidence that Greek companies have not solely been attracted to
the two CEECs by labour costs differentials.
11
Table 3 reports the type of FDI by motivations perceived as most important in
determining the choice to invest. The number of possible motivations was set up equal to
maximum 8 answers. Several issues can be raised from the table. Expected economic growth
scores highest, as a general expectation from the opportunities created by investing abroad,
followed by geographical location, incentives, labour costs and, with a slightly lower frequency,
increase in market shares (both domestic and regional), which are attached approximately the
same importance in all three type categories. Unsurprisingly, both geographical location and
proximity to the EU market are - in relative terms - more significant for exporters than for local
suppliers, whilst for the latter relatively higher scores are attached to factors strictly linked to the
local social environment, such as cultural similarities and historical links. As expected, source of
raw materials is relatively more relevant for exporters than for the other two categories, while,
rather surprisingly, labour skills seem to be relevant in none case.






Expected economic growth 9 41 3 53
Geographical location 9 20 2 31
Investment incentives 8 22 1 31
Labour costs 7 22 2 31
Increase in domestic market share 4 23 2 29
Increase in regional market share 4 23 1 28
Proximity to the EU market 8 8 3 19
Source of raw materials 6 9 0 15
                                                       
10 A distinctive feature which emerged from the survey, not reported in the present work, is the relatively high
share of Greek firms which stated to have undertaken research and development activities as part of their
investment in the CEECs, and particularly in Bulgaria. Although this information needs to be taken with extreme
caution, because it is possible to control neither the quality nor the magnitude of R&D operations located abroad,
the involvement of some applied research and development activity is nonetheless a relevant characteristic of
Greek FDI in the countries considered (see also Iammarino et al. 1998).
11 Many empirical studies, referred to all economies in transition, are in line with this result (see Lansbury, Pain
and Smidkova 1996).12
Cultural similarities 4 10 0 14
Transport costs 3 6 1 10
Political and economic climate 2 4 2 8
Country's chance to join the EU 2 3 2 7
Historical links 1 5 1 7
Energy costs 1 1 1 3
Labour skills 2 1 0 3
The constraints and risks faced by investors in undertaking production activities in
Bulgaria and Romania, always grouped by type of FDI, are listed in Table 4 (maximum number
of possible answers set up equal to 8).






Bureaucracy/administrative constraint 14 40 9 63
Business infrastructure constraint 9 32 4 45
Legislative constraint 11 25 4 40
General economic climate constraint 11 26 2 39
Incoherent and unstable legal system 8 22 3 33
High investment risk 8 20 5 33
Slow pace transition 7 22 3 32
Uncertain or imprecise property rights 9 18 4 31
Undervalued local currency 8 18 2 28
Political uncertainty 8 17 2 27
Custom tariffs and policy constraint 2 16 6 24
Cultural considerations constraint 2 16 5 23
Technological backwardness 2 9 2 13
High foreign indebtedness 2 6 2 10
Overvalued local currency 2 5 0 7
Bureaucracy and administrative constraints are at the top for all three categories. On the
whole, it emerges that general uncertainties of rules are perceived as the most discouraging
factors, as shown by the high scores attached to business infrastructure, legislative and economic
climate constraints in all three categories. Cultural considerations are again perceived as relatively
more important for local suppliers and distributors, as well as custom tariffs, while technological
backwardness, foreign indebtedness and local currency strength seem not to be so influential.









TYPE Exporters 1 15 1 1713
Local suppliers 21 26 12 59
Distributors 4 1 4 9
COUNTRY Romania 12 25 9 46
Bulgaria 14 17 8 39
INDUSTRY Heavy Manufacturing 7 7 4 18
Light Manufacturing 6 11 2 19
High technology 6 9 3 18
Services 7 15 8 30
Finally, Table 5 presents the three categories of control mode of Greek FDI, associated
with the type of investment, the host country and the industry in which the MNE operates. As
emerges from the table, half of investments in our sample are joint ventures, followed by wholly
owned (usually greenfield rather than based on acquisitions) and then FDI in licensing-
franchising. In the case of both Bulgaria and Romania the form of participation in the investment
preferred by Greek parents was the establishment of an entirely new firm through joint venture,
the share of foreign investor, although not always specified, being usually of majority stake.
5.  Empirical findings from the econometric analysis
The results of the econometric analysis are reported in Tables 6-9. Table 6 shows the
multinomial model, while Tables 7, 8 and 9 refer to the logit models. The tables show the value
of the coefficients, the levels of significance measured by t statistics, the number of observations,
the percentage of correct predictions on the total number of observations and the value of the
likelihood function.
In order to analyse the type of investment by motivation and host country, several
multinomial logit models were attempted. In all cases, the probability of having distributors
versus both exporters and local suppliers was not affected by the independent variables.
Therefore, logit models were estimated to investigate how the motivations and the host location
affect the relative probability of being a distributor versus a local supplier, a local supplier relative
to an exporter and a distributor relative to an exporter. As for the multinomial logit, results are
not significant for the category of distributors. The variables were introduced into the models in
different groups to test whether the exclusion or the inclusion of a particular set has an effect on
the significance of the variables: all possibilities considered showed the same result. The industry
dummies turned out not to be significant and are not reported in the tables.14
As emerges from Tables 6 and 7, the significant variables are EUPROX, RAWMAT and
BULGARIA, the signs in the logit being the same as in the multinomial model. This is a rather
satisfactory result and, as the parsimonious logit model (Table 7) is stable in the variables, at least
considering the signs, it provides support for the interpretation attempted. Moreover, the number
or percentage of correct predictions over the total number of observations yields a rather high
correct prediction rate: 85.5% for the general logit model and 78.9% for the parsimonious
specification.
Table 6. Multinomial Logit Model: determination of FDI type by








Constant 0 1.5114* 14.179
DOMESTIC 0 0.96414 -47.847
REGIONAL 0 0.68888 -21.437
GEOLOC 0 -1.0023 -3.6515
TRCOSTS 0 0.52903 -22.695
EUPROX 0 -2.3318*** -13.814
EUJOIN 0 -0.043110 16.463
LCOSTS 0 0.86741 0.46064
LSKILLS 0 -0.92042 -53.098
ENRCOSTS 0 0.26693 85.149
RAWMAT 0 -1.7576* -26.514
INVINC 0 -0.64330 -29.337
EXPGRWTH 0 0.48980 -24.043
CLIM 0 -1.5972 99.984
HISLINKS 0 2.1204 25.872
CULTSIM 0 -0.98250 -95.426
BULGARIA 0 1.4869* 0.71607
Observations 85
Log-Likelihood -30.80225
Notes:  ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance
at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level
A negative value of the coefficient of EUPROX means that the effect of a unit change in
EUPROX on the log odds ratio of the event occurring - i.e. on the log of the relative probability
of being a local supplier relative to an exporter - is negative and of a magnitude equal to  -
2.3318. In other words, the EUPROX decreases significantly the relative probability of being
local suppliers relative to exporters. As expected, proximity to the EU market is likely to foster
outward vertical FDI aiming at gaining access to the core EU market from the Eastern European15
locations, which provide comparative advantages in terms of availability of relatively high skill,
but low cost, labour force.
The motivation of undertaking FDI in order to source raw materials (RAWMAT)
decreases significantly the log odds ratio of being a local supplier relative to an exporter. This
seems in line with the theory, which predicts that the availability of raw materials and resources
would be related to the probability of having export-platform FDI versus market-orientated
investments.
Table 7. Logit Model: determination of FDI type by motivation and host country























Observations (A) 76 76
Correct cases (B) 65 60
% B/A 85.5 78.9
Log-Likelihood -28.03 -34.14
Notes: - ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5%
level, * denotes significance at the 10% level
The empirical evidence gives also some support to the idea that the strategies pursued by
Greek MNEs vary considerably between the two host countries, possibly affecting in different
directions the home industrial base. The country variable (BULGARIA) has an effect on the
relative probability of being a local supplier relative to an exporter: in other words, the choice of16
Bulgaria as host country raises significantly the probability that the investment is in the category
of local suppliers relative to exports. This might be partially due to the different geographical
patterns of trade in the two host countries. Whilst in Romania the proportion of trade with the
EU members has risen sharply since the beginning of the liberalisation process, the same
proportion accounted for less than two-fifths of the recorded trade of Bulgaria in the middle
1990s. Romania is thus likely to be preferred to Bulgaria as an export-platform to both the EU
market and the Central Europe Free Trade Area (CEFTA). The latter in particular provides
scope for export-platform investments from a single production location  throughout the whole
region (Holland and Pain 1998).
12
Somehow surprisingly, labour costs (LCOSTS) do not seem to have an impact on the
likelihood that FDI falls into a particular type category. We would have expected a significant
effect on the probability of being an exporter versus local supplier, particularly because of the
large number of Greek parents operating in traditional and more labour-intensive sectors.
However, as pointed out by Barrell and Pain (1997), since the wages in the two economies in
transition were estimated to be the lowest in Europe in the middle 1990s, labour cost differentials
may have affected the level of the overall Greek investments (domestic and abroad), diverting
capitals from domestic competing locations irrespectively to the type of investment.
13 If this is the
case, outward FDI may have been partly “job exporting”, with firms moving to lower cost
locations (Barrel and Pain 1997).
We turn now to consider the logit model on the constraints faced in investing in Bulgaria
and Romania. As for the previous model, we did not find significant results for the relative
probability of undertaking an investment in the distribution category relative to an investment in
both exporters and local suppliers categories. Table 8 shows that some of the risk perceptions,
such as those linked to macroeconomic instability (GENCLIM), undervalued local currency
(UNDERVAL) and uncertain property rights (PROPRIGHT), affect negatively the relative
probability that FDI falls in the category of local suppliers relative to that of exporters. On the
contrary, cultural constraints (CULTCONS) and custom tariffs (CUSTARIF) increase the log
odds ratio of being a local supplier relative to an exporter.
                                                       
12 Romania joined the CEFTA in 1997. It is worth to recall that Romania’s privatisation schemes, as highlighted
above, was less foreign-oriented than those of Bulgaria, thus discouraging FDI orientated to serve the local
market.
13 Lansbury, Pain and Smidkova (1996) have investigated the possibility of investment diversion from Southern to
Eastern Europe, providing support to the importance of labour costs for the overall level of investment in the
CEECs.17
However, the model is not very stable and the significance of the different variables is
very sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of sets of variables. Usually, the correlation between the
variables has such an effect on the level of significance, sign and magnitude of the coefficients.
Table 8. Logit Model: Determination of the FDI type by constraint






















Observations (A) 76 76
Correct cases (B) 65 60
% B/A 85.5 78.9
Log-Likelihood -29.45379 -33.87918
Notes: - ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes
significance at the 10% level
In fact, considering the parsimonious specification, we find that only two significant
variables - namely custom tariffs constraints and uncertain or imprecise property rights - are
confirmed to have an impact on the likelihood that Greek FDI is either orientated to serve the
local market or is an export-platform FDI. More in particular, the tariff obstacle, as expected,
affects significantly - with a coefficient of 2.4947 - the relative probability that the investment
falls into the category of local suppliers, reflecting the fact that tariff-free trade is a prerequisite
to rationalised and export-platform investment (Holland and Pain 1998). As far as the property
rights variable is concerned, uncertainty and lack of protection affect the expectations of stability
of the context within which MNEs operate, thus influencing the choice between serving the local
market and developing export-orientated operations (Holland and Pain 1998).18
Turning to the analysis of the control mode, also in this case several models were
attempted, but most of them were rather unsatisfactory. As in the case of TYPE, the multinomial
logit turned out not to be a useful analysis, insofar as the results are never significant for the
category of licensing-franchising relative to both wholly owned and joint venture control modes.
Hence, the results of the logit model are reported in Table 9, where only two categories are
considered, i.e. wholly owned and joint venture.
Table 9. Logit model – Determination of FDI control mode by type, industry and host country












Observations (A) 68 68
Correct cases (B) 50 47
% B/A 73.5 69.1
Log-Likelihood -35.27 -36.56412
Notes: - ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, *
denotes significance at the 10% level
The independent variables here considered are TYPE, INDUSTRY and COUNTRY. The
probability of having joint ventures with local firms relatively to whole ownership is significantly
affected by the type categories considered in the model, with a particularly strong effect (for both
the level of significance and the value of the coefficient) in the case of export-platform
investments. This may confirm that, as highlighted by other empirical studies, especially in the
early phase of investing in the CEECs - such is the case of Greek firms - the method of control in
order to negotiate favourable conditions, to serve either the local or other market, is indeed the
joint venture. The results also reveal that the fact that FDI is in the service sector has a positive
effect on the likelihood that investors choose joint ventures relative to full ownership, suggesting
a substantial importance of the knowledge of local conditions for FDI in services.
6. Implications of FDI for the home country and concluding remarks19
Outward FDI has traditionally been seen as an essential factor for economic restructuring
and production rationalisation, necessary for the growth of the national economy in the context
of global markets. Notwithstanding the widespread assumption that such investment is an
indicator of international comparative advantage, some cautions should be applied - especially in
the case of FDI outflow from a LFR - on the basis that outward direct investment might be
beneficial or detrimental to the home industrial base depending upon the strategy followed by the
investor. In particular, some FDI might be opposed for its possible substituting effects on similar
exports, reducing effects on domestic capital investment and negative impact on jobs creation.
Our econometric evidence in this paper provides some support for this proposition, suggesting a
cautious, arguably case by case, pragmatic stance on the part of Greek policy makers.
Our findings also provide a wealth of hints concerning theories of FDI and the MNE. The
role of geography, culture, institutions, expected demand growth, etc., and the choice of
institutional modes can all be linked to such theories. This is, however, beyond the scope of this
paper. Lastly, it is worth noting that our results concern the potential effects of Greek FDI on
Greece, not the CEECs LFRs. Whilst we have data on the perceptions of Greek subsidiaries’
management on this, such need not be an unbiased indicator. It does, however, provide an
interesting avenue for future research.20
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1 = LOCAL SUPPLIERS
2 = DISTRIBUTORS
CONTROL
0 = WHOLLY OWNED
1 = JOINT VENTURE
2 = LICENSING-FRANCHISING
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Industry variables IND0 = 1 if FDI falls into Primary, mining and Heavy manufacturing, 0
otherwise
IND1 = 1 if FDI falls into Light manufacturing, 0 otherwise
IND2 = 1 if FDI falls into High-tech manufacturing, 0 otherwise
IND3 = 1 if FDI falls into Services, 0 otherwise
Country variables BULGARIA = 1 if  FDI was undertaken in Bulgaria, 0 otherwise (Romania)
Motivation variables DOMESTIC = 1 if it is increase in domestic market share, 0 otherwise
REGIONAL = 1 if it is increase in domestic market share, 0 otherwise
GEOLOC = 1 if it is geographical location, 0 otherwise
TRCOSTS = 1 if it is transport costs, 0 otherwise
EUPROX = 1 if it is proximity to the EU market, 0 otherwise
EUJOIN = 1 if it is chance to join the EU, 0 otherwise
LCOSTS = 1 if it is labour costs, 0 otherwise
LSKILLS = 1 if it is labour skills, 0 otherwise
ENRCOSTS = 1 if it is energy costs, 0 otherwise
RAWMAT = 1 if it is source of raw materials, 0 otherwise
INVINC = 1 if it is investment incentives, 0 otherwise
EXPGRWTH = 1 if it is expected economic growth, 0 otherwise
CLIM = 1 if it is economic/political climate, 0 otherwise
HISLINKS = 1 if it is historical links, 0 otherwise
CULTSIM = 1 if it is cultural similarities, 0 otherwise24
Constraint variables BUREAU = 1 if it is bureaucracy/administrative, 0 otherwise
LEGIS = 1 if it is legislative, 0 otherwise
GENCLIM = 1 if it is general economic climate, 0 otherwise
BUSINFRA = 1 if it is business infrastructure, 0 otherwise
POLUNCER = 1 if it is political uncertainty, 0 otherwise
CULTCONS = 1 if it is cultural considerations, 0 otherwise
LEGSYST = 1 if it is incoherent and unstable legal system, 0 otherwise
CUSTARIF = 1 if it is custom tariff and policy, 0 otherwise
INVRISK = 1 if it is, high investment risk, 0 otherwise
SLOWTRAN = 1 if it is slow pace transition, 0 otherwise
TECHBACK = 1 if it is technological backwardness, 0 otherwise
FORDEBT = 1 if it is high foreign indebtedness, 0 otherwise
UNDERVAL = 1 if it is undervalued local currency, 0 otherwise
OVERVAL = 1 if it is overvalued local currency, 0 otherwise
PROPRIGHT = 1 if it is uncertain or imprecise property rights, 0 otherwise
Type variables EXPORTERS = 1 if it is exporter, 0 otherwise
LOCAL
SUPPLIERS
= 1 if it is local supplier, 0 otherwise
DISTRIBUTORS = 1 if it is distributor, 0 otherwise